World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948-1982  (ICPSR 7761 )

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World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948-1982

7761

Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice.

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

Copyright ICPSR, 2000

August, 31, 2000

Jon Brode's SISO script

Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

August, 31, 2000

ICPSR XML Version

Jon Brode

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948-1982

7761

Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice.

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948-1982

7761

Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice.

WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS III, 1948-1982 PART 2: DAILY POLITICAL EVENTS DATA (ICPSR 7761) PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY SECOND ICPSR EDITION SPRING 1985 INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH P.O. BOX 1248 ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48106 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ASSISTANCE ALL MANUSCRIPTS UTILIZING DATA MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE CONSORTIUM SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT FACT AS WELL AS IDENTIFY THE ORIGINAL COLLECTOR OF THE DATA. THE ICPSR COUNCIL URGES ALL USERS OF THE ICPSR DATA FACILITIES TO FOLLOW SOME ADAPTATION OF THIS STATEMENT WITH THE PARENTHESES INDICATING ITEMS TO BE FILLED IN APPROPRIATELY OR DELETED BY THE INDIVIDUAL USER. THE DATA (AND TABULATIONS) UTILIZED IN THIS (PUBLICATION) WERE MADE AVAILABLE (IN PART) BY THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH. THE DATA FOR THE WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS III, 1948-1982 WERE ORIGINALLY COLLECTED BY CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR. NEITHER THE COLLECTOR OF THE ORIGINAL DATA NOR THE CONSORTIUM BEAR ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ANALYSES OR INTERPRETATIONS PRESENTED HERE. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FUNDING AGENCIES WITH ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE USE OF ARCHIVAL RESOURCES AND TO FACILITATE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT ICPSR PARTICIPANTS' RESEARCH ACTIVITIES, EACH USER OF THE ICPSR DATA FACILITIES IS EXPECTED TO SEND TWO COPIES OF EACH COMPLETED MANUSCRIPT OR THESIS ABSTRACT TO THE CONSORTIUM. PLEASE INDICATE IN THE COVER LETTER WHICH DATA WERE USED. INTRODUCTION THIS CODEBOOK DOCUMENTS A DATASET OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVENTS FOR 156 COUNTRIES FOR THE YEARS 1948 TO 1982. DATA ARE REPORTED BY DAY, MONTH, AND YEAR. THE SERIES INCLUDE MEASURES OF POLITICAL PROTEST, GOVERNMENT SANCTIONS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. DATA FOR THE FIRST 20 YEARS WERE ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: SECOND EDITION (NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1972) COMPILED BY CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR AND MICHAEL C. HUDSON. DATA FOR 1968 TO 1977 WERE PUBLISHED IN THE WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: THIRD EDITION (NEW HAVEN: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1983) BY CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR AND DAVID A. JODICE. NOW AN ADDITIONAL FIVE YEARS HAVE BEEN ADDED. FOR THE NEW DATA, SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS REMAIN THE SAME WHEREVER POSSIBLE. MORE EVENT TYPES AND ATTRIBUTES OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND COERCION HAVE BEEN ADDED, BUT THESE ARE ARCHIVED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY CAN BE COLLAPSED INTO THE DEFINITIONS OF THE EARLIER WORK. UNFORTUNATELY, RESOURCES HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT TO RECODE 57,268 RECORDS FOR THE FIRST 20 YEARS. LIST OF INCLUDED COUNTRIES 1 700 AFGN AFGHANISTAN 2 339 ALBN ALBANIA 3 615 ALGR ALGERIA 4 540 ANGL ANGOLA 5 160 ARGN ARGENTINA 6 900 AUSL AUSTRALIA 7 305 AUST AUSTRIA 8 031 BAHAMAS 9 692 BAHRAIN 10 771 BNGL BANGLADESH 11 053 BRBD BARBADOS 12 211 BLGM BELGIUM 13 434 BNIN BENIN 14 760 BHUTAN 15 145 BOLV BOLIVIA 16 571 BTSN BOTSWANA 17 140 BRZL BRAZIL 18 355 BLGR BULGARIA 19 775 BRMA BURMA 20 516 BRND BURUNDI 21 471 CMRN CAMEROON 22 020 CNDA CANADA 23 402 CAPER VERDE 24 482 CAFR CENTRAL AFRICAN REP 25 483 CHAD CHAD 26 155 CHLE CHILE 27 710 CHNA CHINA 28 100 CLMB COLOMBIA 29 580 COMOROS 30 484 CNGO CONGO 31 094 CRCA COSTA RICA 32 040 CUBA CUBA 33 352 CYPR CYPRUS 34 315 CZCH CZECHOSLOVAKIA 35 390 DNMK DENMARK 36 042 DMNR DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 37 130 ECDR ECUADOR 38 651 EGPT EGYPT 39 092 ELSL EL SALVADOR 40 411 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 41 530 ETHP ETHIOPIA 42 375 FNLD FINLAND 43 950 FIJI 44 220 FRNC FRANCE 45 481 GBON GABON 46 420 GMBA GAMBIA 47 265 GDR GERMANY, EAST 48 260 FRG GERMANY, WEST 49 452 GHNA GHANA 50 350 GRCE GREECE 51 055 GRENADA 52 090 GTML GUATEMALA 53 438 GNEA GUINEA 54 404 GUINEA-BISSAU 55 110 GYNA GUYANA 56 041 HATI HAITI 57 091 HNDS HONDURAS 58 720 HGKG HONG KONG 59 310 HNGR HUNGARY 60 395 ICLD ICELAND 61 750 INDA INDIA 62 850 INDS INDONESIA 63 630 IRAN IRAN 64 645 IRAQ IRAQ 65 205 IRLD IRELAND 66 666 ISRL ISRAEL 67 325 ITLY ITALY 68 437 IVCT IVORY COAST 69 051 JMCA JAMAICA 70 740 JPAN JAPAN 71 663 JRDN JORDAN 72 811 KMPC KAMPUCHEA 73 501 KNYA KENYA 74 731 KORN KOREA, NORTH 75 732 KORS KOREA, SOUTH 76 690 KWAT KUWAIT 77 812 LAOS LAOS 78 660 LBNN LEBANON 79 570 LSTO LESOTHO 80 450 LBRA LIBERIA 81 620 LBYA LIBYA 82 212 LXBG LUXEMBOURG 83 580 MDGS MADAGASCAR 84 553 MLWI MALAWI 85 820 MLYS MALAYSIA 86 781 MLDV MALDIVES 87 432 MALI MALI 88 338 MLTA MALTA 89 435 MRTN MAURITANIA 90 590 MRTS MAURITIUS 91 070 MXCO MEXICO 92 712 MNGL MONGOLIA 93 600 MRCO MOROCCO 94 541 MZBQ MOZAMBIQUE 95 790 NPAL NEPAL 96 210 NETHERLANDS 97 920 NZLD NEW ZEALAND 98 093 NCRG NICARAGUA 99 436 NGER NIGER 100 475 NGRA NIGERIA 101 385 NRWY NORWAY 102 698 OMAN 103 770 PKST PAKISTAN 104 095 PNMA PANAMA 105 910 PPNG PAPUA NEW GUINEA 106 150 PRGY PARAGUAY 107 135 PERU PERU 108 840 PHLP PHILIPPINES 109 290 PLND POLAND 110 235 PRTG PORTUGAL 111 006 PRTR PUERTO RICO 112 694 QATAR 113 360 RMNA ROMANIA 114 517 RWND RWANDA 115 403 SAO AND PRINCIPE 116 670 SDAR SAUDI ARABIA 117 433 SNGL SENEGAL 118 591 SEYCHELLES 119 451 SRLE SIERRA LEONE 120 830 SNGP SINGAPORE 121 520 SMLA SOMALIA 122 560 SAFR SOUTH AFRICA 123 365 USSR SOVIET UNION 124 230 SPAN SPAIN 125 780 SRLK SRI LANKA 126 625 SDAN SUDAN 127 115 SURINAME 128 572 SWAZILAND 129 380 SWDN SWEDEN 130 225 SWTZ SWITZERLAND 131 652 SYRA SYRIA 132 713 TWAN TAIWAN 133 510 TNZN TANZANIA 134 800 TLND THAILAND 135 461 TOGO TOGO 136 052 TRNT TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 137 616 TNSA TUNISIA 138 640 TRKY TURKEY 139 351 TFRC TURKISH FEDERATED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 140 500 UGND UGANDA 141 696 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 142 200 UK UNITED KINGDOM 143 002 USA UNITED STATES 144 439 UPVL UPPER VOLTA 145 165 URGY URUGUAY 146 101 VNZL VENEZUELA 147 816 VNMN VIETNAM, NORTH 148 817 VNMS VIETNAM, SOUTH 149 815 VNM VIETNAM 150 990 WESTERN SAMOA 151 678 YMNS YEMEN (SANA) 152 680 YMNA YEMEN (ADEN) 153 345 YGSL YUGOSLAVIA 154 490 ZAIR ZAIRE 155 551 ZMBA ZAMBIA 156 552 ZMBR ZIMBABWE DAILY POLITICAL EVENTS, 1948-1982 EVENT DEFINITIONS PROTEST DEMONSTRATION (TYPE: 700) IS A NON-VIOLENT GATHERING OF PEOPLE ORGANIZED FOR THE ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF PROTESTING A REGIME, A GOVERNMENT, OR ONE OF ITS LEADERS; ITS IDEOLOGY, POLICY, OR INTENDED POLICY; OR ITS PREVIOUS ACTION OR INTENDED ACTION. THE ISSUES OF PROTEST INVOLVED ARE PERCEIVED AS SIGNIFICANT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, BUT WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK DEMONSTRATIONS DIRECTED AT ALL LEVELS AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ARE INCLUDED. THIS CATEGORY OF EVENTS INCLUDES DEMONSTRATIONS FOR OR AGAINST A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, ITS LEADERS, OR ITS VISITING REPRESENTATIVES WHEN SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS ARE REPORTED TO INDICATE OPPOSITION TO THE DEMONSTRATORS OWN GOVERNMENT. NOT INCLUDED ARE ELECTION MEETINGS AND RALLIES, POLITICAL PARADES, AND NORMAL HOLIDAY CELEBRATIONS. A RESIDUAL CATEGORY OF OTHER PROTESTS (712) WAS CODED SEPARATELY FOR THE 1968-1982 PERIOD, BUT WAS AGGREGATED WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. A REGIME SUPPORT DEMONSTRATION (701) IS ALSO A NON-VIOLENT GATHERING OF PEOPLE WHOSE PURPOSE, HOWEVER, IS TO LEND SUPPORT TO A GOVERNMENT, ITS POLICIES AND ACTIONS, OR TO ONE OR MORE OF ITS LEADERS. SUPPORT DEMONSTRATIONS DIRECTED AT ALL LEVELS AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT ARE INCLUDED WHEN THE ISSUES ARE PERCEIVED AS SIGNIFICANT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. INCLUDED ALSO ARE ALL DEMONSTRATIONS THAT ARE NOT CLEARLY OF A PROTEST NATURE; THEREFORE, THE CATEGORY INCLUDES DEMONSTRATIONS THAT, WHILE POLITICAL IN NATURE, CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS EXPLICITLY SUPPORTIVE OF A REGIME. THIS EVENT TYPE WAS AGGREGATED SEPARATELY FOR THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. A RIOT (704) IS A VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION OR DISTURBANCE INVOLVING A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE. RIOTS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE PRESENCE OF VIOLENCE. VIOLENCE IMPLIES THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE AND IS USUALLY EVINCED BY THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, THE WOUNDING OR KILLING OF PEOPLE, THE USE OF RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT SUCH AS CLUBS, GUNS, GAS, AND WATER CANNONS, AND BY THE RIOTERS' USE OF VARIOUS WEAPONS. IF DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY (E.G., THE BURNING OF AUTOMOBILES, THE SMASHING OF STOREFRONTS, AND THE THROWING OF MOLOTOV COCKTAILS) IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THE OBSERVED BEHAVIOR, THE EVENT IS CODED AS A RIOT RATHER THAN AS A DEMONSTRATION. DEMONSTRATIONS THAT CHANGED NATURE WITHIN THE COURSE OF A SINGLE DAY WERE CODED FOR THE 1968-1982 PERIOD SEPARATELY. PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS THAT WERE MET BY POLICE VIOLENCE (702) AND DEMONSTRATIONS THAT TURNED INTO RIOTS OF THEIR OWN ACCORD (703) WERE CODED AS SINGLE EVENTS EACH AND WERE AGGREGATED IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES WITH RIOTS TO FORM A SERIES COMPARABLE WITH THE RIOTS SERIES OF THE FIRST 20 YEARS. FREQUENTLY, DEMONSTRATIONS TURNING VIOLENT WERE THE RESULT OF TWO OR MORE RIVAL GROUPS CLASHING WHEN THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS RAN AFOUL OF EACH OTHER. IN THESE INSTANCES, THE PARTICIPATION OF A MULTIPLICITY OF GROUPS WAS NOTED AMONG THE ATTRIBUTES, BUT ONLY ONE EVENT WAS CODED. RIOTS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ARMED ATTACKS BY THE DEGREE OF SPONTANEITY. RIOTS MAY SOMETIMES BE PLANNED, BUT THE RIOT ORGANIZERS CONSTITUTE A SMALL, OFTEN INVISIBLE, PORTION OF THE RIOTERS. EVENTS WERE CLASSIFIED AS RIOTS IF IT APPEARED FROM THE REPORT THAT MOST OF THOSE INVOLVED WERE VIOLENTLY AGITATED IN THEIR BEHAVIOR, THAT THEY FORMED AN EXCITED OR CONFUSED MOB OR CROWD, THAT THEY WERE ENGAGED IN UNPREDICTABLE ACTS OF DISORDER, AND THAT THE OBJECTS OF THEIR VIOLENCE WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE OBJECTS OF THEIR POLITICAL DISCONTENT IN THE ANALYSIS OF A DISPASSIONATE OBSERVER. AN ARMED ATTACK (705) IS AN ACT OF VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT CARRIED OUT BY (OR ON BEHALF OF) AN ORGANIZED GROUP WITH THE OBJECT OF WEAKENING OR DESTROYING THE POWER EXERCISED BY ANOTHER ORGANIZED GROUP. IT IS CHARACTERIZED BY BLOODSHED, PHYSICAL STRUGGLE, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY. A WIDE VARIETY OF WEAPONS MAY BE USED, INCLUDING GUNS, EXPLOSIVES (CONVENTIONAL BOMBS, HAND GRENADES, LETTER BOMBS), CHEMICALS, BRICKS AND OTHER PRIMITIVE HAND WEAPONS SUCH AS SPEARS, KNIVES OR CLUBS. THIS CATEGORY IS INTENDED TO ENCOMPASS ALL ORGANIZED POLITICAL VIOLENCE, ALTHOUGH ASSASSINATIONS ARE CODED SEPARATELY. IT EXCLUDES ALL SPONTANEOUS VIOLENCE. ALSO EXCLUDED ARE ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZED CRIME WHICH ARE NOT OBSERVED TO BE DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND ISSUES. THE TARGET OF AN ARMED ATTACK IS TYPICALLY A REGIME, A GOVERNMENT, OR A POLITICAL LEADER, BUT IT MAY ALSO BE A RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC, RACIAL, LINGUISTIC, OR SPECIAL INTEREST MINORITY. WHEN A GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CONTROL AN INSURGENCY SITUATION BY NORMAL SANCTIONS (SEE BELOW), IT MAY ALSO RESORT TO ARMED ATTACKS. FOR THE 1968-1982 PERIOD, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, ARMED ATTACKS BY GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY FORCES (707) WERE CODED SEPARATELY FROM THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY INSURGENTS (706). WHEN IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHICH SIDE INITIATED THE EVENT, OR WHEN A BATTLE OR CLASH WAS REPORTED, THE GENERIC ARMED ATTACK CODE (705) WAS USED. ALL THREE TYPES WERE AGGREGATED TOGETHER IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS WERE NOT CODED FOR THE PERIOD 1968-82. WE CODED NEITHER BORDER CLASHES NOR INTERNATIONAL WARS. THE TWO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS GENERAL RULE ARE THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND IN SOUTH VIETNAM (1968-1973) AND THOSE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) IN LEBANON DURING THE RECENT CIVIL WAR. ALTHOUGH THE PLO EMPHASIZES ITS EXPATRIATE STATUS, IT HAD FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ITSELF IN LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR. ITS EXTREME INDEPENDENCE ON THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IS TESTIMONY MORE TO THE "STATELESSNESS" OF LEBANON THAN THE "FOREIGNNESS" OF THE PLO. THE QUASI-AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN ENTITY IN LEBANON IS ANALOGOUS TO THE PRIVATE ARMIES OF THE CHRISTIAN PHALANGE AND THOSE OF THE LEADING POLITICAL PERSONALITIES (KAMAL JUMBLATT, PIERRE GEMAYYAL AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN). THE EXISTENCE OF ALL THESE GROUPS WAS PREDICATED ON INTENSE FAMILIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC LOYALTIES. THESE MUTUALLY-REINFORCING LOYALTIES WERE STRENGTHENED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTIGUITY OF MOST OF THESE SUB-CULTURES. BEGINNING WITH 1968 WE CODED THE UNITED STATES' MILITARY ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS ARMED ATTACKS. WE MADE THIS CHOICE FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN GROUND FORCES BY THAT TIME WAS SO SIGNIFICANT FOR THE SECURITY OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, THAT TO IGNORE THESE EVENTS WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY TO MISREPRESENT THE NATURE OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR. IN NEIGHBORING LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AMERICAN FORCES WERE NOT ENGAGED FOR A SUFFICIENT PERIOD OF TIME NOR IN LARGE ENOUGH NUMBERS TO JUSTIFY A FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE GENERAL RULE AGAINST CODING ARMED ATTACKS BY FOREIGN INTERVENERS. WE DO NOT ARGUE THAT AMERICAN SUPPORT WAS NOT IMPORTANT FOR VIENTIANNE AND PHNOM PENH, BUT RATHER THAT ITS INCURSIONS ALONG WITH SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THAI UNITS INTO THESE COUNTRIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE SUSTAINED AND CONTINUOUS COMMITMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN THE LATTER CASE, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE EVOLVED INTO A LONG-TERM PATTERNED RELATIONSHIP THAT WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. POLITICAL ASSASSINATION (709) IS A POLITICALLY MOTIVATED MURDER OR ATTEMPTED MURDER OF A NATIONAL LEADER, A HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OR A POLITICIAN. AMONG THE NATIONAL LEADERS INCLUDED ARE CHIEFS OF STATE, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, MINISTERS, LEGISLATORS, JUDGES AND HIGH-RANKING CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY OFFICERS. IN ADDITION TO NATIONAL LEADERS, STATE, PROVINCE OR DISTRICT GOVERNORS, MAYORS OF LARGE CITIES, AND NEWSPAPER EDITORS ARE INCLUDED. NATIONALLY PROMINENT POLITICIANS WHO ARE NOT HOLDING OFFICE (E.G., DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ROBERT F. KENNEDY) WERE ALSO INCLUDED. UNSUCCESSFUL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS (708) WERE CODED SEPARATELY IN THE DAILY EVENTS FILE. ONLY SUCCESSFUL ASSASSINATIONS, HOWEVER, WERE AGGREGATED INTO THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY EVENTS FILE. WE EXCLUDED ASSASSINATION PLOTS THAT ONLY REACHED THE PLANING STAGE. CONSISTENT WITH OUR GENERAL PRACTICE WE HAVE CODED ONLY THOSE EVENTS THAT HAVE ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE. RUMORS ABOUT COUPS, ARRESTS OR DEMONSTRATIONS, FOR INSTANCE, WERE NOT CODED. IF AN ACTUAL ATTEMPT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL (E.G., THAT AGAINST GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG, NATO COMMANDER, IN JULY 1979), IT WAS CODED AS A FAILED ASSASSINATION. ONE CAVEAT IS NECESSARY HERE. NUMEROUS (ATTEMPTED) ASSASSINATIONS ARE THE RESULTS OF PERSONAL IDIOSYNCRASIES AND EVEN PSYCHOLOGICAL ILLNESS ON THE PART OF THE ASSASSIN. OFTEN SUCH EVENTS HAVE NO OBVIOUS POLITICAL PURPOSE. HOWEVER, TO JUDGE THEIR POLITICAL RELEVANCE AT EACH OCCURRENCE WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE RELIABILITY OF THE RESULTING SERIES. WE CHOSE TO BE GUIDED IN OUR CODING OF ASSASSINATIONS BY THE IDENTITY AND STATUS OF THE TARGET, RATHER THAN BY THE UNCERTAIN AND OFTEN UNKNOWABLE OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSASSIN. POLITICAL STRIKE IS A WORK STOPPAGE BY A BODY OF INDUSTRIAL OR SERVICE WORKERS OR A STOPPAGE OF NORMAL ACADEMIC LIFE BY STUDENTS TO PROTEST A REGIME OR ITS LEADERS' POLICIES OR ACTIONS. STRIKES WHICH WERE PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT ECONOMIC GOALS (HIGHER WAGES, BETTER WORKING CONDITIONS, SHORTER HOURS) WERE NOT CODED, EVEN IF THE EMPLOYER WAS A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE. IF THERE WERE A GREATER POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE STRIKE WE CODED IT. AN INDICATOR OF SUCH SIGNIFICANCE WOULD BE A POLITICAL PARTY'S OR MOVEMENT'S EMBRACING OF THESE ECONOMIC DEMANDS, AND SUPPORTING AND DISSEMINATING THEM WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF EMBARRASSING THE GOVERNMENT, ERODING ITS BASE OF SUPPORT AND EVEN PRECIPITATING ITS FALL. FOR THE 1968-82 PERIOD WE DISTINGUISHED POLITICAL STRIKES INVOLVING WORKERS (710) FROM THOSE INVOLVING ONLY STUDENTS (711). THE TWO WERE ADDED TOGETHER IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. A POLITICAL STRIKE MAY LAST FOR MANY DAYS OR WEEKS, BUT IT WAS COUNTED AS A SINGLE EVENT, UNLESS ITS ESSENTIAL NATURE CHANGED. FOR EXAMPLE, A NEW CATEGORY OF STRIKERS MIGHT JOIN IN OR A NEW SET OF GOALS MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED. IN CASES OF THIS SORT, A NEW EVENT WAS CODED. A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE (714) IS AN ACT THAT REESTABLISHES OR RECONFIRMS THE TERM OF OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE INCUMBENT LEADER OR RULING GROUP THROUGH THE COUNTRY'S REGULAR INSTITUTIONALIZED CHANNELS FOR THIS PROCEDURE. FORMAL POWER IS NEITHER LOST NOR TRANSFERRED, BUT RENEWED IN THOSE WHO CURRENTLY HOLD IT. THE TERM "REGULAR" MEANS THAT THE CHANGE IS NOT REPORTED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL OR DIRECTLY THREATENED VIOLENCE OR PHYSICAL COERCION AND THAT IT CONFORMS TO THE PREVAILING CONVENTIONAL NORMS OF THE SYSTEM. THE IDEA WAS TO MEASURE CHANGE AND CONTINUITY WITHIN SYSTEMS AS THEY ARE, NOT AS THEY OUGHT TO BE. FOR THE MOMENT WE HAVE HAD TO IGNORE NOTIONS OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE. EXAMPLES OF EXECUTIVE RENEWALS INCLUDE THE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT, THE REELECTION TO PARLIAMENT OF THE PARTY OR PARTIES THAT SUPPORT AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT OR PREMIER, THE REAPPOINTMENT OF AN INCUMBENT PREMIER WHO HAS RESIGNED, A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN A PREMIER OR HIS CABINET AND THE DEFEAT OF A VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE. ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1974, TUNISIA'S BOURGUIBA WAS NAMED PRESIDENT FOR LIFE. THIS WAS CODED AS A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE. A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE WHICH OCCURRED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH ONE OR MORE EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS WAS CODED AS A DISTINCT EVENT TYPE (716). THE TWO ARE AGGREGATED TOGETHER IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. AN UNSUCCESSFUL REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER (717) IS AN EVENT IN WHICH AN ABORTIVE ATTEMPT IS MADE BY PERSONS NOT HOLDING NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE TO OBTAIN SUCH OFFICE THROUGH LEGAL OR CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OFFICE REFERS BOTH TO INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS SUCH AS PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, MONARCHS AND PARTY CHIEFS IN STATES WHERE SINGLE PARTIES EXERCISE DECISIVE POLITICAL POWER AND ALSO TO COLLEGIAL EXECUTIVE BODIES SUCH AS CABINETS COMPOSED OF ONE OR MORE PARTIES OR GROUPINGS. THE TERM "REGULAR" MEANS THAT THE CHANGE IS NOT REPORTED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL OR DIRECTLY THREATENED VIOLENCE OR PHYSICAL COERCION, AND THAT IT CONFORMS TO THE PREVAILING CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE PARTICULAR POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WHICH IT TAKES PLACE. UNSUCCESSFUL REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS ARE "INTERMEDIATE" BETWEEN RENEWALS OF TENURE AND REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS. AN UNSUCCESSFUL REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER IS NOT CODED AFTER AN ELECTION WHICH CONFIRMS THE RULING INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP IN POWER. THIS IS CODED AS A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE. A RECURRING EXAMPLE OF THIS TYPE OF EVENT IS THE APPOINTMENT OF A PREMIER WHO FAILS TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR WHO FAILS TO HAVE HER OR HIS GOVERNMENT APPROVED BY THE LEGISLATURE. EVENTUALLY, WHEN A NEW GOVERNMENT IS FORMALLY INSTALLED, A REGULAR OR IRREGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER IS ALSO SCORED. UNLIKE THE SITUATION FOLLOWING A RENEWAL OF TENURE, THERE IS IN THIS CASE A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IN WHICH POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING BEYOND ROUTINE ADMINISTRATION IS SUSPENDED. AN UNSUCCESSFUL IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER (719) IS A REPORTED ATTEMPT BY AN ORGANIZED GROUP TO REMOVE AND REPLACE THE INCUMBENT NATIONAL EXECUTIVE OUTSIDE THE CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES FOR TRANSFERRING FORMAL POWER. AN IMPORTANT CODING CONDITION FOR SUCH AN EVENT IS THAT AN ACTUAL ATTEMPT AT SEIZING POWER MUST BE REPORTED; IF THE AUTHORITIES DISCOVER A "PLOT" BEFORE ITS IMPLEMENTATION IS UNDERTAKEN, AN UNSUCCESSFUL IRREGULAR TRANSFER IS NOT CODED. THE CRITERION OF SUCCESS IS WHETHER THE INCUMBENT EXECUTIVE IS EFFECTIVELY REMOVED FROM EXERCISING HIS POWERS AND THE CHALLENGER IS INSTALLED IN HIS PLACE. THERE IS NO TIME CONDITION; THUS, A CHALLENGER WHO DISPLACES THE INCUMBENT EXECUTIVE EVEN FOR A PERIOD OF HOURS HAS EFFECTED A SUCCESSFUL IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER. IN ADDITION, THE ATTEMPT MUST TAKE PLACE IN THE CAPITAL OR IN THE PHYSICAL CENTER OF GOVERNMENT. A REVOLT OR MUTINY IN A PROVINCE OR ANOTHER CITY DOES NOT QUALIFY; IT IS AN ARMED ATTACK. "IRREGULAR" EVENTS, THE OPPOSITE OF "REGULAR" AS DEFINED ABOVE, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY ACTUAL OR DIRECTLY THREATENED VIOLENCE AND BY NONCONFORMITY TO THE PREVAILING CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. A GROUP INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING A MEMBER GROUP IN A COALITION; A FACTION WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION, RULING PARTY OR MILITARY; A POLITICAL OPPOSITION PARTY OR MOVEMENT; A DISSATISFIED ELEMENT OUTSIDE OF POLITICS PER SE, SUCH AS A RELIGIOUS BROTHERHOOD; OR FOREIGN CONSPIRATORS CAN STAGE AN UNSUCCESSFUL IRREGULAR TRANSFER. AN EXAMPLE IS A SITUATION IN WHICH DISSIDENT UNITS OF THE ARMY IN CONJUNCTION WITH A POLITICAL PARTY ARE REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN UP POSITIONS AROUND KEY GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS AND KIDNAPPED SEVERAL HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BEFORE BEING CRUSHED BY LOYAL ARMY UNITS. AN IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER (720) IS A CHANGE IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE FROM ONE LEADER OR RULING GROUP TO ANOTHER. THE CHANGE IS ACCOMPLISHED OUTSIDE THE CONVENTIONAL LEGAL OR CUSTOMARY PROCEDURES FOR TRANSFERRING POWER IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT. SUCH EVENTS ARE ACCOMPANIED EITHER BY ACTUAL PHYSICAL VIOLENCE OR WITH THE CLEAR THREAT OF FORCE. THESE EVENTS THUS ENCOMPASS BLOODLESS DEPOSITIONS OF RULERS AS WELL AS THE MORE SPECTACULAR SANGUINARY VARIETY. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE GENERAL PRACTICE, NO QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT IS MADE OF THE SUBSEQUENT SIGNIFICANCE OF AN IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER AS A CRITERION FOR CODING. THUS, SUCH AN EVENT MAY PRECIPITATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, OR THE SYSTEM MAY CONTINUE SUBSTANTIALLY UNCHANGED EXCEPT FOR THE IRREGULARITY OF THE POWER TRANSFER EVENT ITSELF. USERS OF THIS VARIABLE WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED IF THEY THOUGHT OF IT AS AN EXHAUSTIVE INDICATOR OF POLITICAL OR SOCIAL REVOLUTION. IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFERS ARE CLOSER CONCEPTUALLY TO WHAT ARE CONVENTIONALLY THOUGHT OF AS COUPS D'ETAT. THEY ARE PROBABLY MORE NUMEROUS THAN CONVENTIONAL COUPS, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE CODING RULES REQUIRED THAT THE MANY STEPS AND MANEUVERS ASSOCIATED WITH A CRISIS BE RECORDED AS DISTINCT EVENTS. SO THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS IN WHICH EVENTS THAT HISTORIANS MIGHT CONSIDER A SINGLE COUP ARE REPRESENTED HERE BY TWO OR MORE IRREGULAR CHANGE EVENTS. THE ONLY CRITERION FOR A "SUCCESSFUL" IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFER IS THAT THERE BE A REPORT STATING THE NEW LEADERSHIP HAS ACTUALLY REPLACED THE OLD, ARROGATING TO ITSELF THE TITLES AND FUNCTIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE. NO MINIMUM TENURE LIMIT COULD BE IMPOSED AS A CRITERION FOR "SUCCESS" WITHOUT BEING UNDULY ARBITRARY. THERE ARE A FEW CASES IN WHICH TWO IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFERS HAVE OCCURRED ON THE SAME DATE. THE INDICATOR IS MORE SENSITIVE TO MANEUVERINGS AND "COUNTER-COUPS" THAN AN INSPECTION OF THE DEFINITION ALONE MIGHT LEAD ONE TO SUPPOSE. IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFERS SOMETIMES BEGET FURTHER IRREGULAR POLITICAL CRISES. IT HAPPENS EVEN MORE FREQUENTLY THAT AN IRREGULAR TRANSFER IS CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY SEVERAL OTHER KINDS OF GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE AS A NEW REGIME SEEKS TO CONSOLIDATE AND LEGITIMIZE ITS POSITION. AFTER THE COUP, THE COUP LEADERS SOMETIMES INSTALL A PERSON EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT AS PRESIDENT OR PREMIER. SUCH EVENTS WERE CODED AS REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS BECAUSE IN THE NEW POWER CONTEXT SUCH DELEGATIONS OR TRANSFERS OF AUTHORITY CONFORM TO NEW PROCEDURAL NORMS AND ARE NOT ACCOMPANIED BY THREATENED OR ACTUAL COERCION. IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFERS ARE INITIATED BY GROUPS, CLIQUES, CABALS, PARTIES AND FACTIONS EITHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE A GOVERNMENT AND ITS AGENCIES. SOMETIMES THEY ARE CARRIED OUT BY REBELLIOUS MINORITIES WITHIN A COUNTRY, THE MILITARY, OR CONSPIRATORS BACKED BY FOREIGN POWERS. A MUCH MORE MODEST FORM OF GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE IS THE EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT (715). THIS EVENT IS A CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE RULING ELITE AND ITS MOST PREVALENT VARIETY IS THE CABINET COALITION SHIFT. MORE FORMALLY, AN EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT IS A MODIFICATION IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF A NATIONAL EXECUTIVE BODY THAT DOES NOT SIGNIFY A TRANSFER OF FORMAL POWER FROM ONE LEADER OR RULING GROUP TO ANOTHER. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE BODIES INCLUDE CABINETS, COUNCILS OF MINISTERS, PRESIDENTIAL OFFICES, MILITARY JUNTAS, AND RULING PARTY COUNCILS IN STATES IN WHICH AUTHORITATIVE POWER IS WIELDED BY A SINGLE PARTY. MODIFICATION IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF SUCH A RULING BODY, SHORT OF MAJOR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS, TYPICALLY INCLUDES "RESHUFFLES" OR "SHAKEUPS" IN WHICH A SINGLE MEMBER OR A SMALL NUMBER OF LEADERS ARE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THE MEMBERSHIP. THE SIMPLE REDISTRIBUTION OF MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS AMONG THE SAME INDIVIDUALS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT. THERE MUST BE MOVEMENT IN OR OUT OF THE EXECUTIVE BODY. THE CREATION AND ELIMINATION OF CABINET POSTS WERE ALSO CODED AS ADJUSTMENTS. EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS ARE CONSIDERED "MINOR" IN THE POWER PROCESS BECAUSE ONLY ONE OR A FEW POSITIONS CHANGE HANDS. THE CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE LEADER OR RULING GROUP IS NOT REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED OR LOST EITHER WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY TO ANOTHER GROUP, FACTION OR COALITION. IN MOST CASES, ACCORDING TO THE CODING STAFF, THE RULING GROUP MAKES SUCH ADJUSTMENTS TO CONSOLIDATE OR STRENGTHEN ITS SECURITY OR POPULARITY. OFTEN CABINET MINISTERS ARE SACRIFICED TO THE POPULACE AS SCAPEGOATS FOR SPECIFIC POLICY FAILURES. EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS ARE ALSO CONSIDERED "REGULAR" IN THAT THEY ARE NOT REPORTED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL OR THREATENED COERCION OR BY UNCONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES. EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENTS CAN OCCUR AT ANY TIME DURING THE TENURE OF A GOVERNMENT. THEY CAN ALSO BE SCORED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH RENEWALS (716). FOR THE PERIOD 1968-82, WE DISTINGUISHED SIMPLE RENEWALS OF EXECUTIVE TENURE FROM RENEWALS THAT WERE ACCOMPANIED BY ADJUSTMENTS. BUT ADJUST- MENTS OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH MAJOR REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS OR IRREGULAR POWER TRANSFERS ARE NOT SCORED BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EXECUTIVE TRANSFER. A REPORTED MAJOR TRANSFER IN EFFECT OBSCURES THE CONTEXT IN WHICH MERE ADJUSTMENT COULD OCCUR. THE REMOVAL OF A MEMBER FROM AN EXECUTIVE BODY AND HIS SIMULTANEOUS ARREST IS CODED AS GOVERNMENTAL SANCTION RATHER THAN AN EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT. THE DEATH OF A MINISTER IN OFFICE IS CODED AS AN EXECUTIVE ADJUSTMENT MORE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES RATHER THAN BECAUSE THERE WAS A POLITICAL CAUSE FOR THE DEATH. SIGNIFICANT SHAKEUPS CAN OCCUR, OF COURSE, IN MANY EXECUTIVE STRUCTURES BESIDES THE HIGHEST RULING BODY. FOR EXAMPLE, IN SOME COUNTRIES LARGE-SCALE PURGES OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACIES WOULD SEEM TO REPRESENT A KIND OF POWER ADJUSTMENT. NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERATIONS OF COMPARABILITY OF CATEGORIES AND OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION REQUIRED CONFINING THE ARENA FOR THIS VARIABLE TO THE PINNACLE OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. THUS, CHANGES IN A COUNTRY'S GENERAL STAFF HAVE NOT BEEN CODED UNLESS THE GENERAL STAFF ACTUALLY RULED THE COUNTRY. CHANGES IN DEPUTY PREMIERS OR CABINET UNDERSECRETARIES HAVE NOT BEEN CODED. ADJUSTMENTS IN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, BUT PRAESIDIUM MEMBERS AND HEADS OF MINISTRIES HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. A REGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFER (718) IS A CHANGE IN THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE FROM ONE LEADER OR RULING GROUP TO ANOTHER THAT IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH CONVENTIONAL LEGAL OR CUSTOMARY PROCEDURES AND IS UNACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL OR DIRECTLY THREATENED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE REFERS BOTH TO INDIVIDUAL LEADERS, SUCH AS PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS, AND ALSO TO COLLEGIAL EXECUTIVE BODIES, SUCH AS CABINETS COMPOSED OF ONE OR MORE PARTIES OR GROUPS. IN THE LATTER CASE, A CHANGE IS RECORDED IF A CONSTITUENT ELEMENT IS INCLUDED OR IF A NEW ELEMENT REPLACES AN OLD ONE. THE TERM "REGULAR" MEANS THAT THE CHANGE IS NOT REPORTED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL OR DIRECTLY THREATENED VIOLENCE AND THAT IT CONFORMS TO THE PREVAILING CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. IN CONTRAST, "IRREGULAR" CHANGE EVENTS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY ACTUAL OR THREATENED VIOLENCE AND BY ABNORMAL PROCEDURES. CHIEF EXECUTIVES INCLUDE MONARCHS, PRESIDENTS, PRIME MINISTERS, AND PARTY CHIEFS IN COUNTRIES WHERE SINGLE PARTIES EXERCISE DECISIVE POWER, PARALLELING OR SUPERVISING THE AFFAIRS OF GOVERNMENT. ALSO INCLUDED ARE ALL OTHER ANALOGOUS OFFICES AND TITLES THAT MAY NOT ENJOY GENERAL USAGE. FOR A TRANSFER TO BE SCORED, IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICE CHANGE HANDS, BUT THE NEW RECIPIENT OF POWER COULD HAVE HELD OFFICE PREVIOUSLY. CASES IN WHICH AN EXECUTIVE'S TENURE WAS EXTENDED THROUGH ELECTIONS OR OTHER MEANS WERE CODED AS RENEWAL EVENTS. IN SOME POLITICAL SYSTEMS THERE ARE TWO CHIEF EXECUTIVES. TO AVOID QUALITATIVE JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIME MINISTERS OVER PRESIDENTS (E.G., FRANCE) CHANGES IN BOTH OFFICES WERE CODED. IN CONSTITUTIONAL OR TRADITIONAL MONARCHIES CHANGES IN THE PRIME MINISTER WERE CODED. A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WERE UNDER COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION DURING THE PERIOD UNDER INVESTIGATION. IN THESE COUNTRIES, CHANGES IN THE COLONIAL EXECUTIVE, SUCH AS THE GOVERNOR- GENERAL WERE CODED AS POWER TRANSFERS. MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES BECAME INDEPENDENT DURING THE CODING PERIOD. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE 1960-1965 PERIOD IN AFRICA. THE FORMAL CHANGE TO SOVEREIGN STATUS WAS RECORDED AS A POWER TRANSFER EVEN IF THERE HAPPENED NOT TO BE A SIMULTANEOUS CHANGE IN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS. SEVERAL COUNTRIES ALSO UNDERWENT SECESSION OR UNIFICATION DURING THE 1948-82 PERIOD. THESE VIOLENT AND TUMULTUOUS CHANGES WERE CODED AS IRREGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS. EXAMPLES INCLUDED BANGLADESH, SOUTH VIETNAM AND BIAFRA. THE DATE OF THE POWER TRANSFER WAS CODED AS THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE TRANSFER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM WAS CODED ON APRIL 30, 1975, THE DATE OF THE FALL OF SAIGON, RATHER THAN JULY 2, 1976, THE DATE OF FORMAL UNIFICATION. SIMILARLY, CHANGES IN A COUNTRY'S CONSTITUTION THAT CLEARLY INCREASED OR DECREASED A CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S POWERS WERE ALSO COUNTED. SOME CONSTITUTIONS, NOTABLY IN LATIN AMERICA, REQUIRE THE TEMPORARY RESIGNATION OF A PRESIDENT WHILE TRAVELLING ABROAD. SUCH RESIGNATIONS WERE NOT COUNTED UNLESS THE PRESIDENT FAILED TO RESUME OFFICE WHEN HE RETURNED. ANOTHER CODING QUESTION CONCERNS THE DURATION OF A CHANGE EVENT. SOMETIMES, THE CONSUMMATION OF A POWER TRANSFER WITHOUT ANY DISCERNABLE CHANGE EXCEEDED THE 24 HOUR TIME BOUNDARY TYPICAL OF MOST OF OUR EVENTS. CODERS THEREFORE WERE INSTRUCTED TO SCORE THE DATE OF EACH POWER TRANSFER EVENT AS THE DATE ON WHICH IT WAS REPORTED COMPLETED. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A CABINET WERE RESTRUCTURED TO INCLUDE A NEW PARTY, THE EVENT WOULD BE SCORED ON THE DAY THAT THE NEW CABINET ASSUMED POWER, NOT THE DAY WHEN THE OLD ONE RESIGNED. IN THE CASE OF A NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER, THE EXECUTIVE TRANSFER WAS SCORED AS OCCURRING WHEN THE OFFICE WAS TAKEN AND NOT ON THE DAY THE ELECTION RESULTS WERE ANNOUNCED. AN ELECTION IS AN ACT OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE BY A BODY OF PEOPLE ENTITLED TO VOTE. REPORTED EVENTS BY A NATIONAL ELECTORATE TO ELECT NATIONAL LEADERS OR TO EXPRESS A CHOICE ABOUT A POLICY ISSUE WERE CODED. INCLUDED ARE POPULAR ELECTIONS TO NATIONAL LEGISLATURES (722), POPULAR ELECTIONS OF NATIONAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES (724), AND NATIONAL REFERENDA (725). ALSO CODED WERE BY-ELECTIONS (723), BUT THESE WERE NOT AGGREGATED INTO THE TOTAL FOR ELECTIONS IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES FILE. IN ORDER TO MAKE THE NEW AGGREGATIONS COMPARABLE WITH THE EARLIER SERIES OF ELECTIONS FOR THE FIRST 20 YEARS (721), WE AGGREGATED TOGETHER ELECTIONS FOR NATIONAL LEGISLATURES, CHIEF EXECUTIVES, AND REFERENDA DISCOUNTING, HOWEVER, MORE THAN ANY ONE OF THESE ON A SINGLE DAY. NO EXCLUSIONS WERE MADE ON THE BASIS OF SUFFRAGE LIMITATIONS, COMPETITIVENESS, LEGALITY, OR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. EXCLUDED WERE ELECTIONS HELD WITHIN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OR PARTY CONGRESSES, POPULAR ELECTIONS TO BODIES SUCH AS TRADE UNION COUNCILS OR POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP, AND ELECTIONS BELOW THE NATIONAL LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THE CODING WAS MUCH MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD THAN WAS THE CASE WITH EVENTS OF PROTEST AND COERCION, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF AD HOC DECISION RULES WHICH WERE INVOKED AS CODING PROGRESSED. IN THE CASE OF ALGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT ON DECEMBER 12, 1976, WAS CODED AS AN ELECTION EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS ONLY ONE CANDIDATE. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD HAVE CONSIDERED THIS A REFERENDUM ON BOUMEDIENNE'S LEADERSHIP. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SELECTION OF GENERAL GEISEL ON JANUARY 15, 1974, BY THE BRAZILIAN STATE LEGISLATURE WAS NOT CODED AS THE ELECTION OF A NATIONAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A POPULAR ELECTION. THE EVENT WAS CODED AS A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH PUERTO RICO'S STATUS IS AMBIGUOUS, THE ELECTION OF THE GOVERNOR ON NOVEMBER 7, 1968, AND EVERY FOUR YEARS SUBSEQUENTLY, WAS CODED AS AN ELECTION AND, AS APPROPRIATE, AS A REGULAR POWER TRANSFER OR A RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE TENURE. THE IMPOSITION OF CENSORSHIP (726) INCLUDES ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO LIMIT, TO CURB, OR TO INTIMIDATE THE MASS MEDIA, INCLUDING NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, BOOKS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION. TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF SUCH ACTION ARE THE CLOSING OF NEWSPAPERS OR JOURNALS, THE CENSORING OF ARTICLES IN THE DOMESTIC PRESS, AND THE CONTROLLING OF DISPATCHES SENT OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THE RELAXATION OF CENSORSHIP (729) INVOLVES THE MODIFICATION OR ELIMINATION OF CONTROLS ON THE MASS MEDIA. THESE EVENT TYPES ARE REPORTED IN THE DAILY EVENTS FILE, BUT THEY ARE COMBINED WITH REPORTS OF THE IMPOSITION AND RELAXATION OF OTHER RESTRICTIONS IN THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY EVENTS FILE. THE IMPOSITION OF OTHER POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS (727) INCLUDES ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO NEUTRALIZE, TO SUPPRESS, OR TO ELIMINATE A PERCEIVED THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE REGIME, OR THE STATE ITSELF. ALTHOUGH THIS CATEGORY ENCOMPASSES A DIVERSITY OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES, ALL OF THEM SHARE THE CHARACTERISTIC OF CONSTITUTING SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO A PERCEIVED SECURITY PROBLEM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL EVEN THOUGH SANCTIONS ARE SOMETIMES CARRIED OUT BY SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS. AN ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO EXCLUDE SANCTIONS AGAINST CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR THAT HAS NO POLITICAL RELEVANCE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ORGANIZED CRIME OR CRIME IN THE STREETS ARE UNIMPORTANT OR THAT THEY DO NOT INDICATE A DEGREE OF SOCIAL DISSATISFACTION. RATHER, WE HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIN A FOCUS ON BEHAVIOR THAT IS DIRECTLY POLITICAL, I.E., BEHAVIOR CONCERNED WITH THE DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE POLITY. THE RELAXATION OF POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS (730) INVOLVES THE MODIFICATION OR ELIMINATION OF THESE RESTRICTIONS. A POLITICAL EXECUTION (728), THE OUTRIGHT ELIMINATION OF A POLITICAL DISSIDENT, IS A MORE SEVERE FORM OF GOVERNMENTAL SANCTION. THIS EVENT TYPE CONSISTS OF THE EXECUTION OF PERSONS IN THE CONTROL OF THE AUTHORITIES AND UNDER ORDERS OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES. EXCLUDED ARE ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN IF KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN ARRANGED BY THE AUTHORITIES, AND PERSONS KILLED IN RIOTS, ARMED ATTACKS, STRIKES, ETC. ALSO EXCLUDED ARE EXECUTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES SUCH AS MURDER THAT ARE NOT REPORTED TO HAVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. TYPICALLY, A POLITICAL EXECUTION IS ONE IN WHICH THE PERSON EXECUTED IS CHARGED WITH ACTIVITIES THREATENING THE STATE, THE REGIME, THE GOVERNMENT, OR ITS LEADERS. EXECUTIONS FOR POLITICAL CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE 1948 ARE EXCLUDED. REPORTS OF DEATH SENTENCES HANDED DOWN ARE NOT INCLUDED UNLESS THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE SENTENCE WAS CARRIED OUT. DEATHES FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE (713) WAS CODED AS AN EVENT TYPE FOR THE 1948-1967 PERIOD, BUT WAS TREATED AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF OTHER EVENTS FOR THE 1968-1982 PERIOD. HENCE, THERE ARE NO EVENT TYPE 713'S DURING THE LAST 10 YEARS IN THE DAILY EVENTS FILE; DEATH REPORTS APPEAR INSTEAD AS V26. DEATHS FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE OCCUR LARGELY IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARMED ATTACKS AND RIOTS. FOREIGN DEATHS, EXCEPT IN LEBANON AND SOUTH VIETNAM, ARE EXCLUDED. ALSO EXCLUDED ARE POLITICAL EXECUTIONS, DEATHS IN ENEMY PRISONS, DEATHS IN INTERNATIONAL WAR AND BORDER CLASHES, ASSASSINATION VICTIMS, AND HOMICIDE VICTIMS. SOURCES, PARTICULARLY THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX, MAKE BOTH DAILY REPORTS AND PERIODIC CUMULATIVE SUMMARIES OF DEATHS DURING PERIODS OF PROLONGED CIVIL VIOLENCE. MOREOVER, THESE REPORTS CONTAIN INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN TIME PERIODS COVERED AND TOTAL MAGNITUDES REPORTED. ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY AGGREGATES OF DEATHS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE DAILY EVENTS FILE TEND TO UNDERSTATE TOTAL DEATHS IN COUNTRIES WITH EXTENSIVE VIOLENCE. FOR THIS REASON, ADDITIONAL RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED INTO THE SOURCES USED FOR THE DAILY EVENTS FILE BUT WITH CONCENTRATION UPON SUMMARY REPORTS OF DEATHS. THESE DATA HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED TO ADJUST THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES FOR A FEW COUNTRIES. FOR A LIST OF THESE, SEE NOTE ON CLUSTERING THE DAILY EVENTS FOR THE ANNUAL AND QUARTERLY SERIES. ATTRIBUTES OF EVENTS FOR THE 1968-1982 PERIOD SEVERAL ATTRIBUTES FOR EVENTS OF MASS POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE CODED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE SOURCES AND BECAUSE WE DID NOT HAVE UNLIMITED FUNDING, WE COULD NOT BE AS THOROUGH IN THE COLLECTION OF THESE DATA AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED. MISSING DATA AMONG THE ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES ARE GREATER THAN IDEAL. FOR EVENTS OF MASS POLITICAL ACTIVITY (TYPES 700-712), ATTRIBUTE DATA WERE COLLECTED FOR TARGET OR PURPOSE, ISSUE, NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, NUMBER OF INJURIES, EXTENT OF DAMAGE, DURATION OF EVENT, LOCATION OF EVENT, EXTENT OF EVENT, NUMBER OF DEATHS, AND ACTOR GROUP IDENTITIES. SEE THE DAILY EVENTS FORMAT. FOR EVENTS OF IMPOSITION AND RELAXATION OF SANCTIONS (726-730), ONLY ACTOR GROUP IDENTITY WAS CODED. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SANCTIONS, OF COURSE, ACTOR GROUP MIGHT MORE ACCURATELY BE THOUGHT OF AS TARGET (FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW). ALL OTHER ATTRIBUTES FOR SANCTIONS AND ALL ATTRIBUTES FOR GOVERNMENT CHANGE AND ELECTIONS (714-725) WILL APPEAR AS MISSING DATA. THE ATTRIBUTES ARE IRRELEVANT FOR THESE TYPES. DATES OF EVENTS: THE ACTUAL DATE OF EVENT WAS CODED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. OTHERWISE, THE DATE OF REPORT WAS USED. WHEN NO EXACT DATE WAS AVAILABLE, THE FIRST DAY OF THE MONTH WAS ASSIGNED IF THE EVENT APPEARED TO HAPPEN EARLY IN THE MONTH OR THE 15TH WAS ASSIGNED IF IT APPEARED TO HAPPEN LATER. IF AN EVENT LASTED LONGER THAN ONE DAY AND ITS BASIC FEATURES REMAINED UNCHANGED, THE DATE OF THE FIRST DAY WAS CODED AND THE DURATION WAS SPECIFIED IN V23. ----------------------------------

• COUNTRY CODE
• EVENT TYPE
• YEAR
• MONTH
• DAY
• NUMBER OF EVENTS
• MAGNITUDE
• LANNEE POLITIQUE
• AFRICA DIARY
• FACTS ON FILE
• MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
• ASIAN RECORDER
• ASSOCIATED PRESS
• NEW YORK TIMES
• ARCHIV DER GEGENWART
• KEESINGS
• CURRENT DIGEST
• TARGET
• ISSUE
• PARTICIPANTS
• INJURIES
• DAMAGE
• DURATION
• LOCATION
• EXTENT
• DEATHS
• GOVERNMENT
• POLITICAL PARTY
• POLITICAL GROUP
• MILITARY
• CLERGY
• INTELLECTUALS
• WORKERS
• STUDENTS
• MINORITIES
• REVOLUTIONARIES
• GENERAL POPULATION
• ICPSR STUDY NUMBER-7761
• ICPSR EDITION NUMBER-2
• ICPSR PART NUMBER-2

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Notes: 2 UNITED STATES 6 PUERTO RICO 20 CANADA 31 BAHAMAS 40 CUBA 41 HAITI 42 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 51 JAMAICA 52 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 53 BARBADOS 55 GRENADA 70 MEXICO 74 KOREA, SOUTH 75 KOREA, NORTH 90 GUATEMALA 91 HONDURAS 92 EL SALVADOR 93 NICARAGUA 94 COSTA RICA 95 PANAMA 100 COLOMBIA 101 VENEZUELA 110 GUYANA 115 SURINAME 130 ECUADOR 135 PERU 140 BRAZIL 145 BOLIVIA 150 PARAGUAY 155 CHILE 160 ARGENTINA 165 URUGUAY 200 UNITED KINGDOM 205 IRELAND 210 THE NETHERLANDS 211 BELGIUM 212 LUXEMBOURG 220 FRANCE 225 SWITZERLAND 230 SPAIN 235 PORTUGAL 260 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (WEST) 265 GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST) 290 POLAND 305 AUSTRIA 310 HUNGARY 315 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 325 ITALY 338 MALTA 339 ALBANIA 345 YUGOSLAVIA 350 GREECE 351 TURKISH CYPRUS 352 CYPRUS 355 BULGARIA 360 ROMANIA 365 SOVIET UNION 375 FINLAND 380 SWEDEN 385 NORWAY 390 DENMARK 395 ICELAND 402 CAPE VERDE ISLANDS 403 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 404 GUINEA-BISSAU 411 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 420 GAMBIA 432 MALI 433 SENEGAL 434 BENIN 435 MAURITANIA 436 NIGER 437 IVORY COAST 438 GUINEA 439 UPPER VOLTA 450 LIBERIA 451 SIERRA LEONE 452 GHANA 461 TOGO 471 CAMEROON 475 NIGERIA 481 GABON 482 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 483 CHAD 484 CONGO 490 ZAIRE 500 UGANDA 501 KENYA 510 TANZANIA 516 BURUNDI 517 RWANDA 520 SOMALIA 530 ETHIOPIA 540 ANGOLA 541 MOZAMBIQUE 551 ZAMBIA 552 ZIMBABWE 553 MALAWI 560 SOUTH AFRICA 570 LESOTHO 571 BOTSWANA 572 SWAZILAND 580 MADAGASCAR 581 COMOROS 590 MAURITIUS 591 SEYCHELLES ISLANDS 600 MOROCCO 615 ALGERIA 616 TUNISIA 620 LIBYA 625 SUDAN 630 IRAN 640 TURKEY 645 IRAQ 651 EQYPT 652 SYRIA 660 LEBANON 663 JORDAN 666 ISRAEL 670 SAUDI ARABIA 678 YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC 680 PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 690 KUWAIT 692 BAHRAIN 694 QATAR 696 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 698 OMAN 700 AFGHANISTAN 710 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 712 MONGOLIA 713 TAIWAN 740 JAPAN 750 INDIA 760 BHUTAN 770 PAKISTAN 771 BANGLADESH 775 BURMA 780 SRI LANKA 781 MALDIVES 790 NEPAL 800 THAILAND 811 KAMPUCHEA 812 LAOS 815 VIETNAM 816 VIETNAM, NORTH 817 VIETNAM, SOUTH 820 MALAYSIA 830 SINGAPORE 840 PHILIPPINES 850 INDONESIA 900 AUSTRALIA 910 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 920 NEW ZEALAND 940 SOLOMON ISLANDS 945 VANUATU 950 FIJI 990 SAMOA

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Variable Text: V2 EVENT TYPE

Range of Valid Data Values: 700-742

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Variable Text: V3 YEAR

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Variable Text: V4 MONTH

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Variable Text: V5 DAY

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Variable Text: V6 NUMBER OF EVENTS

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Variable Text: V7 MAGNITUDE THE RANGE OF MAGNITUDE FOR THE EVENT IS RECORDED AS A POWER OF 10. IF 10-99 PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED, THE MAGNITUDE IS 1, ETC.

Range of Valid Data Values: 1-2

Range of Invalid Data Values: 0

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Variable Text: V8 SOURCE: L'ANNEE POLITIQUE

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Variable Text: V9 SOURCE: AFRICA DIARY

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Variable Text: V10 SOURCE: FACTS ON FILE

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Variable Text: V11 SOURCE: MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

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APPENDIX *** NOTE 2 *** VARIABLE 18 THROUGH 37 APPLY TO DATA FOR 1968 TO 1982 ONLY; THESE FIELDS SHOULD BE IGNORED FOR EARLIER DATES.